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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Ruby Urgent, an applicant for a Court Security Officer (CSO) position, sued the
United States Marshals Service alleging that it violated Title VII. She contends her
application was rejected by the Marshals in retaliation for a discrimination claim Urgent’s
friend filed five years prior. Because we conclude that Urgent was not an applicant for
employment in the federal government, we will affirm the order of the District Court
granting summary judgment in favor of the Marshals.1
MVM, Inc., a private contractor, supplied CSOs to work in federal courthouses.
Urgent submitted her application to MVM for a CSO position in 2011. MVM
interviewed Urgent, evaluated her references, and determined she met the minimum
requirements for the position. MVM then gave her application to the Marshals so they
could conduct a background investigation. Deputy Marshal Darby Kirby was assigned
this task in August 2011.
Urgent told the Marshals that she lived alone. But the investigation revealed that
Diedre Finch2 and Finch’s son lived with Urgent. Finch was a former Lead Court
Security Officer (LCSO) who was fired by MVM five years prior. Kirby included all of
this information in the “Special Factors” section of her investigation report.

1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We give plenary review to a district
court's order granting summary judgment, and we apply the same standard that the
district court applied. Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University, 851 F.3d 249,
256 (3d Cir,. 2017).
2
She was formerly known as Diedre Valmont.
3

The deadline for completing the investigation was October 14, 2011. On October
5, 2011, Kirby told Urgent she needed to sign an additional authorization so the Marshals
could review an internal affairs file from the Virgin Islands Police Department, Urgent’s
former employer. Urgent complied with this request on October 11 but the Police
Department did not transmit the file in time to meet the October 14 deadline. On October
14, Kirby submitted Urgent’s background investigation report, though incomplete, to the
Marshals’ Judicial Security Inspector, Daniel Winfield.
Winfield mistakenly believed that Urgent had been uncooperative about supplying
authorizations and errantly concluded that she caused the incomplete investigation. He
recommended to his supervisor, Reggie Bradshaw, that the deadline for completing
Urgent’s report should not be extended. This foreclosed Kirby’s attempt to supplement
the report two weeks later, after she received the internal affairs file. On November 15,
2011, LCSO Gregory Evans notified Urgent that she did not pass the background
investigation and was disqualified for the CSO position. A former CSO subsequently
told her that she was not hired because she lied on her application about living alone.
Urgent maintains she did not lie and that it was a misunderstanding.
Urgent filed an Equal Employment Opportunity complaint with the Department of
Justice alleging age and sexual discrimination. Urgent also checked a box on the EEO
complaint indicating she was asserting a reprisal claim. She then retracted it explaining
she did not understand the meaning of “reprisal.” But later Urgent asserted to an EEO
investigator that the Marshals intentionally failed her on her background investigation to

4

retaliate against Finch who, Urgent said, had filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit against
MVM five years prior.
The Agency concluded in a final decision on May 21, 2013, that the evidence did
not support Urgent’s allegations of age and sexual discrimination. The Agency noted her
remarks about Finch and Finch’s lawsuit. But it also commented in its analysis that even
if she was right—that the Marshals refused to hire her because of her friendship with
Finch—she did not proffer enough evidence to show their relationship fell within a
protected category.
Urgent filed this case with the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, 3
focusing only on her claim that the Marshals retaliated against her.4 She maintained that
she was forced to “pass through the gauntlet” of the Marshals’ background check, giving
them control over the hiring and firing of CSOs. She contended that this control was
dispositive evidence that she was an applicant for federal employment. The District
Court acknowledged the unique circumstance here: a federal agency conducting
background checks on behalf of a private employer. But it reasoned that, even assuming
the Marshals did control aspects of the hiring process, the rest of the record—including
Urgent’s own admissions about MVM being her employer—showed she was an applicant

“All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in
executive agencies . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
4
The Marshals assert that Urgent did not exhaust her retaliation claim because she
retracted her EEO reprisal claim. However, the Agency comments in its final decision on
Urgent’s references to Finch, and its inclusion of this information in its analysis indicates
it was, at a minimum, aware of the gist of her retaliation claim. Therefore, we do not
regard this claim as waived.
3
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to be an employee of MVM, not the Marshals.5 The District Court decided section
2000e-16 did not authorize this lawsuit.
Urgent now appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Marshals. She reiterates the arguments she made before the District Court and says it
erred by restricting section 2000e-16 to only those who “literally” applied to a federal
agency. We disagree with Urgent’s characterization of the District Court’s decision.
But, even if we assume—solely for purposes of summary judgment—that the background
check gives the Marshals complete control of the decision to hire or reject CSO
applicants, we still cannot find any reason to disturb the judgment of the District Court.
Urgent premises her claim on the fact that she was only an applicant. Because of
this, she argues, the Title VII employer analysis should be collapsed to look only at who
has the power to hire and fire CSOs. We are not persuaded. See Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 214
(3d Cir. 2015). In Title VII claims, we look to the factors set out in Darden, which
generally focus on ‘“the level of control the defendant[s] . . . exerted over the plaintiff.”’
Covington v. International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114,
119 (3d Cir. 2013). This includes an inquiry into ‘“which entity paid [the employees’]
salaries, hired and fired them, and had control over their daily employment activities.”’

The District Court highlighted Urgent’s concession that she submitted her application to
MVM. The District Court also pointed out that Urgent signed a document as part of her
application acknowledging that MVM would hire her “to work on their behalf” and that
she could not “at any time represent [herself] as an employee of [the Marshals].”
5

6

Faush, 808 F.3d at 214 (quoting Covington, 710 F.3d at 119). No one factor in the
Darden analysis is decisive. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324.
Here the Marshals established that they do not pay the CSOs and that a site
supervisor employed by the private contractor performs daily supervision of the CSOs at
the courthouse. Urgent conceded in her complaint, in her briefing, and at oral argument
that MVM pays, trains, and provides daily supervision of the CSOs.6 Therefore, the
undisputed evidence shows that two of three central factors in the Darden analysis do not
support a conclusion that the Marshals could be considered an employer. On this record,
we are convinced that MVM, not the Marshals, is Urgent’s sole employer for purposes of
Title VII.7
Because we conclude that Urgent was an applicant to be an employee of a private
contractor, rather than an employee of the federal government, we must rule that section
2000e-16 does not authorize Urgent to bring this lawsuit. Accordingly, we will not reach
the merits of her discrimination claim.
For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

6

In her reply brief, Urgent notes that the Marshals established employment standards for
CSOs, monitors these standards, and can fire CSOs if they do not meet those standards.
Even if we accept, for purposes of summary judgment, that this is a proper
characterization of the Marshals’ efforts and authority, this evidence is still insufficient to
ground a reasonable inference that the Marshals exercised daily or routine supervision
over the CSOs.
7
With this record, our assessment would not change even if we agreed with Urgent that a
joint-employer analysis is appropriate here. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 173
(3d Cir. 2007).
7

